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Edit File: EVP_DigestVerify.3

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Always turn off hyphenation; it makes .\" way too many mistakes in technical documents. .if n .ad l .nh .SH "NAME" EVP_DigestVerifyInit, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate, EVP_DigestVerifyFinal, EVP_DigestVerify \- EVP signature verification functions .SH "SYNOPSIS" .IX Header "SYNOPSIS" .Vb 1 \& #include <openssl/evp.h> \& \& int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx, \& const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY *pkey); \& int EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, size_t cnt); \& int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, \& size_t siglen); \& int EVP_DigestVerify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigret, \& size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); .Ve .SH "DESCRIPTION" .IX Header "DESCRIPTION" The \s-1EVP\s0 signature routines are a high-level interface to digital signatures. .PP \&\fBEVP_DigestVerifyInit()\fR sets up verification context \fBctx\fR to use digest \&\fBtype\fR from \s-1ENGINE\s0 \fBe\fR and public key \fBpkey\fR. \fBctx\fR must be created with \fBEVP_MD_CTX_new()\fR before calling this function. If \fBpctx\fR is not \s-1NULL,\s0 the \&\s-1EVP_PKEY_CTX\s0 of the verification operation will be written to \fB*pctx\fR: this can be used to set alternative verification options. Note that any existing value in \fB*pctx\fR is overwritten. The \s-1EVP_PKEY_CTX\s0 value returned must not be freed directly by the application if \fBctx\fR is not assigned an \s-1EVP_PKEY_CTX\s0 value before being passed to \fBEVP_DigestVerifyInit()\fR (which means the \s-1EVP_PKEY_CTX\s0 is created inside \fBEVP_DigestVerifyInit()\fR and it will be freed automatically when the \&\s-1EVP_MD_CTX\s0 is freed). .PP No \fB\s-1EVP_PKEY_CTX\s0\fR will be created by \fBEVP_DigestSignInit()\fR if the passed \fBctx\fR has already been assigned one via \fBEVP_MD_CTX_set_pkey_ctx\fR\|(3). See also \s-1\fBSM2\s0\fR\|(7). .PP \&\fBEVP_DigestVerifyUpdate()\fR hashes \fBcnt\fR bytes of data at \fBd\fR into the verification context \fBctx\fR. This function can be called several times on the same \fBctx\fR to include additional data. This function is currently implemented using a macro. .PP \&\fBEVP_DigestVerifyFinal()\fR verifies the data in \fBctx\fR against the signature in \&\fBsig\fR of length \fBsiglen\fR. .PP \&\fBEVP_DigestVerify()\fR verifies \fBtbslen\fR bytes at \fBtbs\fR against the signature in \fBsig\fR of length \fBsiglen\fR. .SH "RETURN VALUES" .IX Header "RETURN VALUES" \&\fBEVP_DigestVerifyInit()\fR and \fBEVP_DigestVerifyUpdate()\fR return 1 for success and 0 for failure. .PP \&\fBEVP_DigestVerifyFinal()\fR and \fBEVP_DigestVerify()\fR return 1 for success; any other value indicates failure. A return value of zero indicates that the signature did not verify successfully (that is, \fBtbs\fR did not match the original data or the signature had an invalid form), while other values indicate a more serious error (and sometimes also indicate an invalid signature form). .PP The error codes can be obtained from \fBERR_get_error\fR\|(3). .SH "NOTES" .IX Header "NOTES" The \fB\s-1EVP\s0\fR interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in preference to the low-level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible. .PP \&\fBEVP_DigestVerify()\fR is a one shot operation which verifies a single block of data in one function. For algorithms that support streaming it is equivalent to calling \fBEVP_DigestVerifyUpdate()\fR and \fBEVP_DigestVerifyFinal()\fR. For algorithms which do not support streaming (e.g. PureEdDSA) it is the only way to verify data. .PP In previous versions of OpenSSL there was a link between message digest types and public key algorithms. This meant that \*(L"clone\*(R" digests such as \fBEVP_dss1()\fR needed to be used to sign using \s-1SHA1\s0 and \s-1DSA.\s0 This is no longer necessary and the use of clone digest is now discouraged. .PP For some key types and parameters the random number generator must be seeded. If the automatic seeding or reseeding of the OpenSSL \s-1CSPRNG\s0 fails due to external circumstances (see \s-1\fBRAND\s0\fR\|(7)), the operation will fail. .PP The call to \fBEVP_DigestVerifyFinal()\fR internally finalizes a copy of the digest context. This means that \fBEVP_VerifyUpdate()\fR and \fBEVP_VerifyFinal()\fR can be called later to digest and verify additional data. .PP Since only a copy of the digest context is ever finalized, the context must be cleaned up after use by calling \fBEVP_MD_CTX_free()\fR or a memory leak will occur. .SH "SEE ALSO" .IX Header "SEE ALSO" \&\fBEVP_DigestSignInit\fR\|(3), \&\fBEVP_DigestInit\fR\|(3), \&\fBevp\fR\|(7), \s-1\fBHMAC\s0\fR\|(3), \s-1\fBMD2\s0\fR\|(3), \&\s-1\fBMD5\s0\fR\|(3), \s-1\fBMDC2\s0\fR\|(3), \s-1\fBRIPEMD160\s0\fR\|(3), \&\s-1\fBSHA1\s0\fR\|(3), \fBdgst\fR\|(1), \&\s-1\fBRAND\s0\fR\|(7) .SH "HISTORY" .IX Header "HISTORY" \&\fBEVP_DigestVerifyInit()\fR, \fBEVP_DigestVerifyUpdate()\fR and \fBEVP_DigestVerifyFinal()\fR were added in OpenSSL 1.0.0. .SH "COPYRIGHT" .IX Header "COPYRIGHT" Copyright 2006\-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. .PP Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the \*(L"License\*(R"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file \s-1LICENSE\s0 in the source distribution or at <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.